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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

5 March 1982

Mr. Brian V. Kinney
Chief, Declassification and
Historical Research Branch
Records Management Division
Washington Headquarters Services
Room 1D517, Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Mr. Kinney:

Your memorandum of 16 February 1982 forwarded five documents with the request that we review their classification status. We have reviewed these documents and have determined the following:

The memorandum dated 2 November 1954, Subject: "Reactions to US Courses of Action with Respect to Nationalist China (as described in paras. 1-3, pp. 4-7 of memorandum considered by the Council on 28 October)," Copy No. 3, must be kept at the SECRET level under Section 1-301(c) of Executive Order 12065 to protect intelligence sources and methods. Under the Executive Order it should be scheduled for systematic re-review in the year 2012.

The note dated 15 June 1954, identified as TOP SECRET GODEL FROM SULLIVAN regarding Soviet biographic data, Copy No. 2, must be kept at the CONFIDENTIAL level under, Section 1-301(c) of Executive Order 12065 to protect intelligence sources and methods. It should be scheduled for systematic re-review in the year 1992.

The letter dated 13 February 1952, from Raymond B. Allen, Director of the Psychological Strategy Board to Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Director of Central Intelligence must be kept at the CONFIDENTIAL level under Section 1-301(c) of Executive Order 12065 to protect intelligence sources and methods. It should be scheduled for systematic re-review in the year 1992.

The letter dated 2 July 1951, regarding the Revision of NSCID-5, TS No. 62095, can be declassified from the CIA point of view.

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Enclosures

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The memorandum dated 27 April 1954, Subject: "An International Volunteer Air Group," with one attachment, "Outline Plan for the Activation of an International Volunteer Air Group," Copy No. 8, must be kept at the CONFIDENTIAL level under Section 1-301(c) and (d) to protect intelligence sources and methods and U.S. foreign relations. It should be scheduled for systematic re-review in the year 1992.

We have marked the documents with our classifications and return them to you herewith as requested.



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Chief, Classification Review Division
Office of Information Services
Directorate of Administration

Enclosures:

1. Memo, 2 Nov 54
2. Note, 15 June 54
3. Letter, 13 Feb 52
4. Letter, 2 July 51
5. Memo, 27 April 54

Distribtuion:

- Orig - Addressee w/atts
1 - CRD Liaison w/DOD, w/atts 1&4
1 - CRD Chrono, w/o atts



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62-131044
Spec ops matter
1948 thru 1956
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington 25, D. C.

Office of the Director

C O P Y

November 2, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Reactions to US Courses of Action with Respect to Nationalist China (as described in paras. 1-3, pp. 4-7, of memorandum considered by the Council on 28 October)

There follows an estimate of Communist and non-Communist reactions to certain proposed US courses of action with respect to Nationalist China. Pursuant to conversations between the Secretary and Under Secretary of State and the Director, this estimate has been prepared within CIA without consultation with the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

ASSUMPTIONS

1. The Mutual Defense Treaty will be negotiated regardless of UN Security Council action on the off-shore islands.
2. The US intent to negotiate a Mutual Defense Treaty with Nationalist China will be announced before or simultaneously with the introduction of the resolution in the Security Council.
3. The Nationalist government has given its approval to the Security Council resolution and the geographic limitation inherent in the Defense Treaty.

ESTIMATE

I. UN ACTION ON THE RESOLUTION

1. Most non-Communist countries would probably approve of the proposal that the UN be seized of the problem of the off-shore islands.

2. The Chinese Communists feel strongly that the off-shore islands are an integral part of Peiping's territory and would be reluctant to have the question of their disposition dealt with by the UN. Nevertheless, we believe that the USSR will not veto the

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Resolution out of hand, though this may result in some strain in Sino-Soviet relations. Rather we believe the USSR will introduce or support expansion of the Resolution to provide for an immediate or eventual territorial settlement covering the off-shore islands and possibly Formosa as well. Unless the Resolution is changed to cover such a settlement for the islands, the USSR will almost certainly exercise its veto. If the Resolution were to cover a settlement for the off-shore islands but not for Formosa, we believe the chances of a Soviet veto would be substantial but less than even.

II. THE COMMUNIST REACTION

3. Communist China and the USSR would vigorously denounce the Treaty. Although we believe that the Communists will maintain their basic objective of gaining control over Formosa, they would probably attempt to obtain control through subversion rather than through military action. As for the UN Resolution, we do not believe that either its adoption or rejection will significantly affect Communist policy toward Formosa.

h. We believe that the Chinese Communists would not attack the off-shore islands while the Resolution was pending, provided that the period of discussion did not exceed, say, 30 days. They would be deterred from such action by fear of a strong adverse worldwide reaction and by uncertainty as to US reaction. Thereafter:

a. If a resolution were adopted covering territorial settlement for the islands, we believe that, although the Chinese Communists would continue minor harassments, they would probably not take courses of action that clearly contravened the spirit of the resolution.

b. In the unlikely event that a resolution were adopted not covering a territorial settlement for the islands, we believe that the chances of Chinese Communist breach of the resolution would be increased.

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* This estimate was made in SNIL 100-4/1-5h, "The Situation with Respect to the Nationalist Occupied Islands off the Coast of Mainland China", published 10 September 1954.

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5. The Chinese Communists would probably estimate that the Treaty (With or without the Resolution) did not significantly alter the balance of power situation in the Formosa area. Hence the Treaty would be unlikely to bring about a major redeployment of their armed forces or any significant change in their courses of action elsewhere in Asia.

III. NON-COMMUNIST REACTION

6. The non-Communist world would generally receive the Treaty with qualified approval. Although most peoples and governments have little sympathy with the Chiang regime, and would regret the formal perpetuation of the US commitment, approval will be generally forthcoming, if the defensive character of the Treaty and particularly the restraints on Chinese Nationalist action can be well established. In these circumstances, the Treaty, together with US support of UN action on the off-shore islands, will be regarded as a welcome indication that the US is not bent on policies involving considerable risk of war. It will seem a contribution to the current relaxation of East-West tensions.

7. To South Korea, the new US policy will be unwelcome because it will indicate an end of the chances of strong US pressure on Communist China. To India, on the other hand, the Treaty with Chiang will appear as further evidence of US imperialistic interference in Asian affairs. Non-Communist Southeast Asia might interpret the restraints on the Nationalists as indicating a weakening of US determination to resist Communism, but we believe that the importance of this factor would depend primarily on subsequent US policies in this area.

8. The Overseas Chinese have been increasingly looking to the Communist Chinese rather than the Nationalists as the effective power in China. The Treaty would tend to increase this trend. However, whether the Overseas Chinese become an increasing source of instability will depend far more on the policy of the local government toward them.

9. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Treaty would tend to undermine the guiding principle and the chief inspiration of Chiang's regime. Readjustment would be difficult. Possibilities for Communist subversion on Formosa would be increased. Developments on the island would depend greatly on the nature of US policy toward the Formosa government under the new circumstances.

C. F. SMITH
Lieutenant General, USAF
Acting Director




CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

2 July 1951

The Honorable George C. Marshall
The Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C.



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Dear General Marshall:

I have carefully studied the proposed revision of NSCID-5 as prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and have compared it with the original directive which it is designed to replace. The proposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff appears to disregard the intent of Congress as expressed in the National Security Act of 1947 and as revealed in the record of Congressional hearings prior to the passage of the Act. During these hearings it was made clear that the purpose of Congress in enacting the law was to centralize control of clandestine activities abroad. The term, "services of common concern," as finally written into the law was used, among other subjects, to cover clandestine espionage operations.

The proposed revision seems also (see paragraph 1, subparagraph a of the draft) to disregard the fact that the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence is to the National Security Council and the President—a status which was reaffirmed recently in the President's hand-written comments on the Joint Chiefs of Staff document proposing revision of NSC 10/2, which also pertains to this Agency. The special operations of this Agency are designed to support in every possible way the requirements of the Departments and Services which operate under the statutory members of the National Security Council but the channel of responsibility to the National Security Council remains clear.

From the practical point of view, it is unwise to have a number of different authorities conducting clandestine operations. When I assumed my present duties, I found that a number of Government Departments were operating their own "spy nets" abroad. One

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

- 2 -

or two of these were voluntarily transferred to CIA control in accordance with the intent of law. Others remain in existence, and we cross trails from time to time; sometimes with ludicrous and occasionally with rather tragic results. On the whole, however, this multiplicity of control of a very sensitive type of operation is a thoroughly bad business. I believe it can be corrected in time by establishing a broader base of confidence and cooperation in CIA operations and by improving those operations to the point where they meet the needs of the agencies CIA is designed to serve.

NSCID-5 as presently in effect, after stating in paragraph 1 that the Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all organized Federal espionage operations outside the United States and its possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information required to meet the needs of all Departments and Agencies concerned in connection with the national security, makes exception "for certain agreed activities by other Departments and Agencies." I am prepared at any time to discuss any such activities proposed by other Departments and Agencies and to endeavor to reach an agreement with respect to them. Furthermore, I am obligated under paragraph 4 of NSCID-5 to coordinate such agreed activities of "casual agents" with the organized covert activities.

I wish to make it clear that this Agency is entirely willing to place its personnel under the American theater commander in any theater of active military operations where American troops are engaged and is equally willing, and indeed anxious, to coordinate its activities with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If it is necessary to formalize this attitude, a brief statement like that embodied in the recently approved revision of paragraph 4, NSC 10/2, should be sufficient. Accordingly, I do not believe that the proposed revision merits consideration by the National Security Council. The present directive seems quite adequate.

Faithfully,





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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

February 16, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, CLASSIFICATION REVIEW DIVISION, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Request for Declassification Review

During the systematic review of all classified Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) documents over 20 years old, the Declassification and Historical Research Branch, Records Management Division, Directorate for Correspondence and Directives, Washington Headquarters Services, turned up the attached document(s).

The documents were either originated by your agency, contain information for which your agency is the classification authority, or are otherwise of interest to you.

It is therefore requested that your agency review the documents and recommend declassification, continued classification at the present or lesser level of classification, and/or review by other agencies. If your agency is recommending continued classification, in accordance with Paragraph 3-401, Executive Order 12065, it is requested that an authority for continued classification be specified, along with a date for the next review.

The time permitted by Executive Order 12065 to reach the point where all OSD documents over 20 years old have been reviewed, and the large volume of over 20 year old OSD documents, make it necessary to request your response within 60 days. In your response, you may wish to provide guidance with regard to what categories of information you do and do not wish to have referred to you in the future.

Your assistance in effecting this review will be most appreciated. Please return the documents to Mr. Brian V. Kinney, Chief, Declassification and Historical Research Branch, Records Management Division, Washington Headquarters Services, Room 1D517, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301, upon completion of your review.

Without attachments, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.

E. E. Lowry Jr.
E. E. Lowry, Jr.
OSD Records Administrator

Attachments (5)

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OSD-DB-TS-033-82

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

1. Memo, Nov 2, 54, Subj: Reactions to US Courses of Action with Respect to Nationalist China (as described in paras. 1-3, pp. 4-7, of memorandum considered by the Council on 28 October), Copy No. 3 (TS)
2. Note, 15 Jun 54, Re: Soviet Biographic Data, Copy No. 2 (TS)
3. Letter, Feb 13, 52, Re: Psychological Strategy Board Ninth Meeting (TS)
4. Letter, 2 Jul 51, Re: Revision of NSCID-5, No. 62095 (TS)
5. Memo, Apr 27, 54, Subj: An International Volunteer Air Group/w 1 Attachment--
Paper, Apr 26, 54, Subj: Outline Plan for the Activation of an International Volunteer Air Group, Copy No. 8 (TS)